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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Melvin McCabe appeals from the district court's summary dismissal of his 
petition for post-conviction relief and from its denial of his motion for the 
appointment of post-conviction counsel. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In affirming McCabe's judgment of conviction entered upon his guilty plea 
to possession of methamphetamine, the Idaho Court of Appeals described the 
underlying facts and proceedings as follows: 
While arresting McCabe for driving without privileges, an 
officer found a cigarette pack containing methamphetamine on 
McCabe's person and various drug paraphernalia in his vehicle. 
McCabe was charged with possession of a controlled substance 
with the intent to deliver, driving without privileges, possession of 
drug paraphernalia, failure to provide proof of insurance, and being 
a persistent violator. The State later filed an amended information, 
charging an enhancement under Idaho Code § 37-2739 based on 
McCabe's prior misdemeanor conviction for possession of drug 
paraphernalia. 
McCabe was appointed counsel, who, upon McCabe's 
request, filed a motion to withdraw. The district court denied the 
motion and McCabe pied not guilty. McCabe's counsel filed a 
second motion to withdraw, and after conducting a Faretta inquiry, 
the district court determined that McCabe made a "free and 
voluntary decision to represent himself' and allowed counsel to 
withdraw. 
McCabe pied guilty to an amended charge of possession of 
a controlled substance, I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1 ), and the section 37-
2739 enhancement, in exchange for dismissal of the remaining 
counts and an agreement to recommend a unified sentence of 
fourteen years, with six years determinate. The district court 
imposed the sentence recommended by the State. McCabe filed a 
timely notice of appeal and then filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 
motion for reduction of sentence, which the district court denied 
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without a hearing. McCabe filed a motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea and a motion for a retroactive competency hearing, arguing, in 
relevant part, that he was under the influence of methamphetamine 
such that he was unable to knowingly and intelligently waive his 
right to counsel and to enter a guilty plea. Following a hearing, the 
district court denied both motions 
State v. McCabe, Docket No. 41357, 2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 789, pp.1-2 
(Idaho App., October 30, 2014) (footnote omitted). The Idaho Court of Appeals 
affirmed McCabe's conviction and the district court's denial of McCabe's motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea. kt 
McCabe then filed a prose petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.3-26.) 
McCabe alleged: (1) his guilty plea and his waiver of his right to counsel were 
constitutionally invalid because he was not informed that the Jerome County 
Public Defender, who had previously represented him, had a fixed-fee contract 
with Jerome County, which, McCabe asserted, constituted a conflict of interest; 
and (2) the state "maliciously and vindictively" pursued the persistent violator 
sentencing enhancement without the appropriate predicate offenses. (Id.) 
McCabe also requested the appointment of counsel to represent him on the 
petition. (R., pp.30-32.) 
The district court denied McCabe's motion for appointment of counsel, 
concluding that McCabe's post-conviction claims were frivolous. (R., pp.37-38.) 
After providing notice (R., pp.33-47), the court then summarily dismissed 
McCabe's petition (R., pp.64-70). McCabe timely appealed. (R., pp.71-75.) 
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ISSUE 
McCabe states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the court err by denying Mr. McCabe's request for 
appointment of counsel when he alleged that his appointed counsel 
labored under a conflict of interest and that performance was 
adversely affected by the conflict? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 6.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has McCabe failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion 




McCabe Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion By Denying His Motion To Appoint Post-Conviction Counsel With 
Respect To His Conflict Claim 
A. Introduction 
McCabe contends that the district court erred by denying his motion for 
appointment of counsel with respect to his conflict claim. (See generally 
Appellant's brief.) McCabe's claim fails because a review of the record reveals 
that McCabe failed to allege facts demonstrating the possibility of a valid claim. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel to 
represent a post-conviction petitioner pursuant to I.C. § 19-4904 is discretionary. 
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); Plant v. 
State, 143 Idaho 758, 761, 152 P.3d 629, 632 (Ct. App. 2007). 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion To Deny McCabe's 
Motion For Appointment Of Counsel 
Post-conviction counsel should be appointed if the petitioner qualifies 
financially and "alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim such that a 
reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain counsel to 
conduct a further investigation into the claim." Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 
655,152 P.3d 12, 16 (2007); see also Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793,102 P.3d at 
1112. If the claims are so patently frivolous that there appears no possibility that 
they could be developed into a viable claim even with the assistance of counsel, 
however, the court may deny the motion for counsel and proceed with the usual 
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procedure for dismissing meritless post-conviction petitions. Workman v. State, 
144 Idaho 518, 529, 164 P.3d 798, 809 (2007); Newman v. State, 140 Idaho 491, 
493, 95 P.3d 642, 644 (Ct. App. 2004). 
In his post-conviction petition, McCabe asserted that his guilty plea and 
his waiver of his right to counsel were constitutionally invalid because he was not 
informed that the Jerome County Public Defender, who had previously 
represented him, had a fixed-fee contract with Jerome County. 1 (R., pp.7-10.) 
McCabe asserted that had he been informed of the fixed-fee contract, he would 
have "opted for conflict-free counsel outside the office of the Jerome County 
Public Defender," and that his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to the 
Fourth Amendment would have been successful. (R., p.7.) 
The district court denied McCabe's motion for appointment of counsel and 
summarily dismissed McCabe's post-conviction petition after concluding that 
McCabe's conflict claim was frivolous. (R., pp.37-38, 64-70.) The court's 
decision was based upon several grounds, including: (1) McCabe failed to allege 
facts raising the possibility of a valid conflict of interest claim; and (2) McCabe 
waived his conflict claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal. (R., pp.64-67.) A 
review of the record supports the district court's determination. 
1 McCabe also alleged that the persistent violator sentencing enhancement was 
not supported by appropriate predicate offenses. (R., pp.25-26.) McCabe does 
not challenge the district court's denial of his motion for appointment of counsel 
and summary dismissal of his petition with respect to this claim. (See generally 
Appellant's brief.) 
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1. McCabe Failed To Allege Facts Demonstrating The Possibility Of A 
Valid Conflict Of Interest Claim 
The right to conflict-free representation derives from the Sixth Amendment 
as applied to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1931 ). The right has been 
accorded "not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of 
the accused to receive a fair trial." Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166 (2002) 
(quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984)). 
Where a defendant raises a conflict of interest claim alleging that his 
counsel's personal interests directly conflict with counsel's obligation to provide 
effective representation, the defendant must demonstrate that a conflict of 
interest actually affected the adequacy of his lawyer's performance. State v. 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 61-62, 90 P.3d 278, 286-287 (2003); see also Cuyler v. 
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980) (where defendant alleges a conflict based 
upon his counsel's simultaneous representation of defendant and the 
prosecutor's key witness, defendant must demonstrate that an actual conflict of 
interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance). Absent such a showing, a 
defendant is not entitled to reversal of his conviction. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 173-
74; Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 785 (1987). 
An actual conflict is defined by its effect on counsel, not by whether there 
is a "mere theoretical division of loyalties." Mickens, 535 U.S. at 171, 172 n.5. 
"[TJhe possibility of conflict is insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction." Dunlap 
v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 62, 106 P.3d 376, 388 (2004) (citations omitted). An 
actual conflict will be shown to adversely affect counsel's performance where a 
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link between counsel's deficient performance and the conflict of interest is 
demonstrated. See Lewis v. Mayle, 391 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2004); see also 
United States v. Burns, 526 F.3d 852, 857 (5th Cir. 2008) (actual conflict 
adversely affects counsel's performance when "there was some plausible 
alternative defense strategy that could have been pursued, but was not, because 
of the actual conflict"). 
As with other types of conflict of interest allegations, a defendant asserting 
that his counsel had a financial-based conflict must demonstrate a link between 
the alleged conflict and some deficient counsel performance. See Bonin v. 
Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 825 (9th Cir. 1995) ("The fact that an attorney undertakes 
the representation of a client because of a desire to profit does not by itself 
create the type of direct 'actual' conflict of interest required."). Further, courts 
generally presume counsel "will subordinate his or her pecuniary interests and 
honor his or her professional responsibility to a client." Caderno v. United States, 
256 F.3d 1213, 1219 (11 th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Taylor, 129 F.3d 924, 
932 (D.C. Cir. 1998)); see also Roll v. Bowersox, 16 F. Supp.2d 1066, 1078 (W.D. 
Mo. 1998) (noting that "counsel are often required to represent clients without 
being paid in full," but rejecting conflict of interest claim where there was "no 
indication that counsel minimized the time spent on this case because he knew 
he would not get paid for numerous hours of preparation"). Therefore, no per se 
conflict arose from the fixed-fee arrangement between Jerome County and the 
Jerome County Public Defender. 
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Further, as the district court correctly recognized (R., p.39 n.3), the fixed-
fee arrangement in Jerome County was valid under Idaho law. While the Idaho 
legislature recently amended I.C. § 19-859(4) to prohibit such fixed-fee contracts 
between counties and public defenders, this amendment only applies to such 
contracts "entered into or renewed on or after" the effective date of the 
amendment, March 25, 2014. I.C. § 19-859(4). The public defender contract at 
issue in the present case went into effect in October 2011 and expired in 
September 2013. (R., p.13.) McCabe entered his guilty plea in May 2013. 
(#41357,2 5/13/13Tr., p.6, L.14-p.24, L.22.) 
McCabe has also failed to allege facts demonstrating that any theoretical 
attorney conflict caused by the fixed-fee arrangement resulted in deficient 
counsel performance. McCabe did not describe the nature of the Fourth 
Amendment suppression issue, nor did he attempt to explain how such a motion 
would have been successful had he been appointed substitute counsel. 3 Though 
McCabe implied that his appointed counsel spent little time on his case because 
2 The Idaho Supreme Court granted McCabe's motion to augment the record with 
transcripts prepared for McCabe's underlying direct appeal, Docket No. 41357. 
(8/18/15 Order.) 
3 After the district court granted McCabe's appointed counsel's motion to 
withdraw from the case, and permitted McCabe to represent himself, McCabe 
filed a pro se suppression motion. See Idaho Data Repository, Jerome County 
Case No. CR-2013-00317). The district court denied this motion after a hearing. 
(See id.) It appears that no transcript of this hearing was prepared for McCabe's 
direct appeal, and that no such transcript is part of the appellate record in this 
case. Missing portions of the record are presumed to support the actions of the 
court below. State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541, 835 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Ct. App. 
1992). Further, McCabe did not challenge the district court's denial of his motion 
to suppress on direct appeal. See McCabe, Docket No. 41357, 2014 
Unpublished Opinion No. 789. 
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of the fixed-fee arrangement (See R., pp.8-9), he has not specifically asserted 
that appointed counsel's apparent decision declining to pursue a suppression 
motion constituted deficient performance, nor has he alleged any facts 
supporting such an assertion. McCabe's conclusory and vague assertions did 
not entitle him to the appointment of counsel to represent him on his post-
conviction petition. 
Finally, McCabe's statements made during the hearing on his appointed 
counsel's second motion to withdraw are contrary to his implied assertion in his 
post-conviction petition that counsel performed less work on his case than she 
would have absent the fixed-free arrangement. At that hearing, McCabe stated 
that appointed counsel did an "outstanding job" on his case, and that his decision 
to represent himself was "no reflection on her." (#41357, 3/4/13 Tr., p.13, L.15 -
p.14, L.20.) McCabe also specifically declined to request substitute counsel 
upon the withdrawal of his appointed counsel. (#41357, 3/4/13 Tr., p.11, L.24 -
p.12, L.3.) While McCabe had previously sought the appointment of substitute 
counsel (see R., p.34), he informed the court that he changed his mind and 
wished to represent himself. (#41357, 3/4/13 Tr., p.9, L.23- p.10, L.10.) This is 
contrary to McCabe's assertion from his post-conviction petition that he would 
have sought substitute counsel, rather than represent himself, if he had been 
informed of the fixed-fee arrangement between Jerome County and the Jerome 
County Public Defender's Office. 
McCabe failed to allege facts demonstrating the possibility of a valid 
conflict of interest claim. He has therefore failed to demonstrate that the district 
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court abused its discretion by denying his motion for appointment of counsel with 
respect to this claim. 
2. McCabe Waived His Conflict Claim By Failing To Raise It On Direct 
Appeal 
Post-conviction petitions are not substitutes for appeals, and applicants for 
post-conviction relief are not allowed to raise issues in post-conviction 
proceedings that could have been raised on direct appeal unless the issues were 
not known and could not reasonably have been known during the direct appeal. 
I.C. § 19-4901 (b). Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 606, 21 P.3d 924, 928 
(2001); Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573,581,976 P.2d 927,935 (1999); Rodgers v. 
State, 129 Idaho 720, 932 P.2d 348 (1997). 
In this case, as the district court correctly concluded, McCabe waived his 
conflict claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal. McCabe alleged that he was 
not personally aware of the factual basis for the alleged conflict - the fixed-fee 
contract between Jerome County and the Jerome County Public Defender - at 
the time he waived his right to counsel and entered a prose guilty plea. (R., p.7.) 
However, it appears from the record that McCabe and/or his appointed appellate 
attorney were aware, or reasonably could have been aware, of this factual basis 
for the claim at the time he challenged his conviction on direct appeal. In his 
response to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss his post-conviction 
petition, McCabe asserted that he "discussed with appellate counsel the 
possibility of raising the constitutionality of the waiver of counsel." (R., p.55.) In 
an attempt to raise an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel post-conviction 
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claim,4 McCabe further alleged that appellate counsel "refused" to raise this issue 
on appeal. (Id.) McCabe was not entitled to a second opportunity to raise this 
issue in a post-conviction petition. The district court therefore correctly 
determined that the claim was waived pursuant to I.C. § 19-4901 (b). 
The district court correctly concluded that McCabe failed to allege facts 
raising the possibility of a valid conflict claim. McCabe has therefore failed to 
show that the district court abused its discretion in denying McCabe's motion for 
appointment of counsel, or by summarily dismissing his post-conviction petition. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order denying McCabe's motion for appointment of counsel and order summarily 
dismissing McCabe's post-conviction petition. 
DATED this 2nd day of November, 2015. 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
4 The district court acknowledged McCabe's assertion that his appellate counsel 
was ineffective, but declined to consider the claim because it was raised for the 
first time in McCabe's response to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss 
the petition. (R., p.67 (citing Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 978 P.2d 241 (Ct. 
App. 1999).) McCabe has not challenged this determination on appeal. 
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